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0. In tr o d u c t io n
This paper addresses the m uch-debated issue of the Principle o f Compositionality, 
the exact content, the  form ulation and the validity of which has been questioned 
so often. In its weakest form, it requires the in terp re ta tion  of na tu ra l-language 
u tterances to assign meanings in a more or less system atic m anner. In M ontague’s 
(1970) classical version, it stipulates a perfect parallelism  between sem antic and  
syntactic structu res. Its validity has been questioned on the basis of the  influence of 
the (u tterance-ex ternal and utterance-internal) context on in terp re ta tion . Finally, 
it also has acquired an intuitive  meaning, which roughly corresponds to  m inim izing 
idiomaticity.
In this paper, I will argue th a t the principle of com positionality has several 
weak points, which make its actual content far weaker than  its in tu itive  in te r­
p re ta tion . As a  m a tte r  of fact, the principle is almost vacuous in  its popu lar 
form. S ec t io n  1 introduces the principle and explains w hat its weak points are. 
I conclude th a t Com positionality must be strengthened if it is to  act as a m ore 
substan tia l constrain t on in terpretation. I will also explain how the in tu itive idea 
th a t idioms are exceptions to Com positionality can be m ade m ore technical.
S ec t io n  2 presents a language tha t is prototypically non-com positional in the  
in tuitive sense. T he language in question is the com m and language of the Unix 
operating system. A fter explaining the basics of the language (S e c t io n  2.1), I 
will argue th a t it is no accident th a t users have difficulty m astering it. A lthough 
its in te rp re ta tion  is perfectly compatible w ith the popular form of the  principle 
of com positionality, it is fundam entally different from  n a tu ra l languages in ways 
obviously re la ted  to  the intuitive concept of com positionality as described in the  
first section (S ec t io n  2.2).
S e c t io n  3 is the core of the paper. I propose two additional constrain ts 
on the  in te rp re ta tio n  of natural-language expressions: Independence says th a t 
the m eanings assigned to sub-expressions in an expression m ust not depend on 
each o th e r’s shapes (S ec tio n  3.1); and A dditiv ity  prohibits operations com bin­
ing m eanings from  destructively modify any previously assigned m eanings (S e c ­
t io n  3.2). I also sketch an in terpretation m echanism  for Unix com m ands th a t 
respects Strong Compositionality, i.e., the conjunction of Com positionality, In ­
dependence and  A dditivity. S ection  3 .2 .1  deals w ith the particu la r problem  of 
trea ting  default m echanism s w ithout violating Additivity.
S ec t io n  4 in tends to draw some consequences of Strong C om positionality  for 
the sem antics of n a tu ra l languages. In particu lar, in S ectio n  4 .1  I argue th a t 
the m athem atica l m etaphor of ‘incom plete’ expressions seen as functors m ust be 
abandoned in term s of the principle of additivity. Instead, I will propose to a b an ­
don the concept of ‘sem antic incompleteness’ altogether, so th a t the  com bination 
of m eanings yields ju s t m ore complete meanings from less com plete ones. S e c ­
t io n  4 .2  is abou t the  expression-internal interactions of meanings. I argue th a t
2such interactions are no t excluded by Independence (which only bans interactions 
in te rm s of formal properties), nor by Additivity (inasmuch as the  interactions 
are n o t destructive). I sketch possible analyses of phenomena in which such in­
te rac tio n s  are involved. In particu lar, I argue th a t the meanings of adjectives and 
nouns in  ‘intersective m odification’ constructs are ‘brought into harm ony’ in a 
non-destructive way before the ‘in tersection’ operation is perform ed, and this type 
of analyses can perhaps be extended to other types of complex expressions, such 
as preposition /noun  an d  verb /d irec t object constructs. In conclusion, I suggest 
th a t , by relying on the  same mechanisms as we use for treating  default values, the 
analyses are com patible w ith Strong Compositionality. Finally, in S e c tio n  4.3, 
I in tro d u ce  an operation called coalesced intersection, which can be used instead 
of function  application for combining meanings. This section is about the possi­
ble techniques tha t allow us to trea t the meanings of syntactically complete and 
incom plete expressions on a pair, w ithout type theoretic distinctions.
1. C o m p o s it io n a lity
It is h a rd  to imagine a  language for which no compositional in terp re ta tion  exists 
un d er th e  usual definition of com positionality:1
(1) Compositionality
T he meaning of a  complex expression is a function of the meanings of its 
sub-expressions and  of the way in which they are put together.
It seem s obvious th a t, for any complex expression whatsoever, as long as we can 
determ ine  ‘the way in which its constituents are pu t together’, th is criterion can 
be satisfied .2 The definition in (1) has at least three loose points th a t are jointly 
responsible for this:3
(2) Weak points o f compositionality
(i) the function  used for combining the meanings of the sub-expressions 
can be any function at all;
(ii) there is no a  priori lim itation on w hat objects meanings can be;
(iii) in the definition above, there  are no constraints as to how the meanings 
should be assigned to the  various sub-expressions.
Let m e now elaborate on each point in (2i—iii) above.
A d  (2i): There are few things a function cannot do. In particu lar, we can 
define functions pointwise so th a t their behaviour cannot be considered uniform  in
1 For the variants of this definition and their history, see P artee  (1984) and 
Szabó (1995).
2 Cf. Partee (1984).
3 Partee  (1984) raises the same problems.
3any in tu itive sense. T h a t is, although the intuitive content of com positionality im ­
plies th a t, under norm al circumstances, the same constituent in the sam e syntactic  
role will play the  sam e sem antic role, this is not guaranteed by the definition in (1). 
For exam ple, a word like yesterday could easily m ean ‘yesterday’ in some sentences 
and ‘accidentally’ in others in term s of (1). True, a word like yesterday could be 
polysemous in the sense th a t there would be two hom onym ous (hom ophonous) 
words of this shape, one of which means ‘yesterday’ and the o ther ‘accidentally’. 
In th a t case, we would consider them  two different expressions (the surface shapes 
of which incidentally coincide), and the principle of com positionality would apply 
to b o th  expressions separately and independently. On the  o ther hand, were this 
to be the  case, our hypothetical word yesterday would lead to am biguities in most 
cases. T h a t is, m ost sentences would be ambiguous if they contained it as a  con­
stituen t. But the definition in (1) would even allow a s itua tion  in which yesterday 
could unam biguously refer to  ‘yesterday’ in some cases, and  ‘accidentally’ in all 
others, which is ha rd  to imagine in any hum an language. (This exam ple will be 
contrasted  w ith o ther types of ‘am biguities’ in S ect io n  4.2.)
A d  (2ii): There are few things we could not do w ith artificial m eanings.4 
The sim plest way of showing this is the following. Obviously, the in ten tion  of the 
principle of com positionality as formulated in (1) is th a t the meanings of complex 
expressions depend on the meanings ra ther than  the forms of their sub-expressions. 
However, if w hat a  ‘m eaning’ is is not constrained, then  we could assign character 
strings to  certain  sub-expressions as their meanings (say, character strings corre­
sponding to their orthographic form), and have the com bination function behave 
differently depending on w hat those strings are, thereby getting  around an  essen­
tial aspect of w hat (1) intends to claim. I will not have too much to say about 
this in  the  following. Note, however, th a t a remedy for the  weakness in (2i) could 
also help solving (2ii): For example, if the com bination functions sim ply cannot 
perform  operations on character strings, then  the above ‘trick’ is not feasible.
A d  (2iii): There are few things we could not do if we did not constrain  the 
assignm ent of m eanings to expressions. A lthough the principle of com positionality 
intends to  constrain  the assignment of meanings to complex expressions, we can 
still do alm ost anything if the  assignments of meanings to  simple expressions is 
left unconstrained . For example, if we could determ ine the  m eaning of a  simple 
sub-expression depending on w hat other expressions occur in the complex expres­
sion (and  ‘the way in which they are put together’), then  the  meanings of complex 
expressions could depend on the shape of their constituents, which would be un ­
desirable, as poin ted  out in (2ii) above.
M y conclusion is th a t new principles, constraining the  com positionality p rin ­
ciple in  (1), should be developed and adopted for the syn tax /sem antics interface
4 Cf. Janssen  (1983) and Partéé (1984).
4of natural languages. They m ust constrain bo th  the class of functions th a t can be 
u sed  for combining the m eanings of the sub-expressions of a  complex expression, 
a n d  the way in which sim ple expressions are assigned meanings. The following 
sections will be devoted to  such constraints.
Before proceeding, let m e briefly digress on a problem th a t bo th  the trad itional 
concept of compositionality an d  the stric ter version to be proposed m ust face. This 
problem  is th a t non-transparent expressions by definition violate the principle of 
compositionality, since th e ir meanings are unpredictable from the meanings of 
th e  words th a t they contain and  the way they are combined.5 There are various 
possibilities of dealing w ith such expressions.
First, we could say th a t they  constitute exceptions from  the principle (th a t is, 
we could form ulate the principle in such a way th a t it applies to transparent com­
plex  expressions only). I believe this is incorrect, because m any non-transparent 
expressions are partially com positional, and preventing the principle of compo­
sitionality from applying to  them  would make wrong predictions. For example, 
in  languages th a t make lexical distinctions between verbs w ith different aspec­
tu a l properties, an idiom headed  by a verb th a t belongs to a particu lar aspectual 
class will behave accordingly. Thus, in Russian, there are no idioms headed by 
perfective verbs tha t are n o t perfective as a  whole, and so on.
Second, we could say th a t  non-transparent expressions are somehow not com­
plex  at all. This would also be incorrect, because most non-transparent complex 
expressions p a tte rn  together w ith  transparent ones, and partic ipate  in sim ilar pro­
cesses, so th a t their syntactic complexity is undeniable. Now, the term  complex 
expression in the principle (1) is to be understood in the syntactic sense, or the 
en tire  principle becomes vacuous.
Third, we can say th a t th e  idiomatic, non-transparent aspect of a complex ex­
pression belongs to ‘the way in which the sub-expressions are p u t together’. I think 
th is  is the only correct way of dealing w ith non-transparent expressions. For ex­
am ple, take the upper hand is clearly a complex expression w ith a non-transparent 
m eaning. Now assume th a t ‘the  way in which its parts are pu t together’ is not 
sim ply the derivation th a t produces analogous transparent expressions, b u t an 
exceptional, qualified version of th a t derivation, which produces ju s t this phrase. 
T h en  its m eaning can be seen as perfectly compositional. True, this procedure 
w ould allow us to explain away many odd cases; it would even allow us to  trea t 
intuitively non-compositional languages as compositional (but having m any excep­
tio n a l derivations, maybe for every expression). But positing special derivations is
5 This problem was used as a counter-argum ent against com positionality by 
Bresnan (1978), am ong others.
5costly and  calls for independent m otivation. On the other hand, this tre a tm e n t al­
lows us to  tre a t ‘partia lly  transparen t’ expressions correctly, since any exceptional 
derivation m ay have regular, non-exceptional aspects.
To conclude, I would like to emphasise th a t the problem  of non -transparen t 
expressions is unrelated  to the problems of com positionality m entioned in the 
rem arks (2i—iii) above and, in general, to the issues addressed in this p ap e r , so the 
argum ents given above are tangential to the m ain points to be made.
2. A  N o n -C o m p o s it io n a l L an gu age
As I suggested in the  above, the sense in which natural languages are in tu itively  
com positional is m uch narrower than  the definition in (1). To illu s tra te  this, 
and to come closer to  w hat further constraints should be imposed, let m e briefly 
present a language which is wildly non-com positional in the intuitive sense, i.e., 
very dissim ilar to n a tu ra l languages, although it can be given a com positional 
in te rp re ta tion  under the definition (1). The language in question is the  language 
of Unix commands. As a m atter of fact, probably the com m and language of any 
com puter operating  system  would do. I chose Unix because it is best know n to 
the academ ic community. The reader fam iliar w ith the basics of Unix com m ands 
may skip the  following sub-section.
2.1 . B a s ic s  o f  U n ix  C om m an d s
A Unix com m and (also called command line) consists of a  command n a m e , fol­
lowed by a  list of options (which are in principle all optional and their o rd e r does 
not m a tte r  in principle), followed by zero or more arguments (some of w hich may 
be optional). (The options and the argum ents together are called parameters.) 
For exam ple, the  com m and name rm (for ‘remove’) can be followed by th e  options 
-d , - f , - i  a n d /o r  - r ,  and an argum ent (file) (the name of the file to be rem oved).6
O ptions come in two varieties: they either consist of a hyphen a n d  a  string 
(such an option is called a switch or a Bag: the options of rm m entioned  above 
belong here), or a hyphen, a string and an o ther string. For example, the  com m and 
line
make - f  (makefile) (target)
6 I will make unforgivable simplifications here and in the following as far as 
the  real complexities of the Unix com m and language are concerned. For 
exam ple, in actual fact, many other options can appear w ith rm in  various 
im plem entations, and in all im plem entations, more th an  one file n am e  can 
be given.
6invokes the program  make w ith  the argum ent (target), and  specifies th a t the  rules 
o f producing the  target are described in a file called (makefile). The la tte r type of 
options are said  to consist o f an  option letter  ( - f  above) followed by its argument 
((makefile) above). (W hether a blank is needed between the option le tte r and 
its  argument depends on th e  im plem entation, or even on the  individual com m and 
names.) W ith  some com m and names, the flags and the option letters can be mixed 
freely, and th e  arguments o f th e  option le tters  may follow a conglomerate of flags 
an d  option letters in the o rd e r in which th e  corresponding option le tters occur. 
In  some cases, such a conglom erate can be w ritten  in one single word, introduced 
w ith  a single hyphen. So, if  the command nam e make can be followed by the 
flag -n  (‘do nothing, ju s t show  what you would do’), then  the following may be 
equivalent in an im plem entation:
make -n  - f  (makefile) (target) 
make -n  -f(m akefile) (target) 
make -n f  (makefile) (target) 
make - fn  (makefile) (target)
As I said , options are in  principle optional, but sometimes the s itua tion  is 
m uch more complex. For exam ple, it may happen th a t the  presence of either a 
particular argum ent or a particu lar option is obligatory. For example, the  com­
m and  name g rep  (‘look for strings in a file’) can  be followed by an argum ent (expr) 
(the  expression describing th e  strings to look for) or an option ‘- f  (exprfile)’ (the 
nam e of a file in which such an  expression is to  be found); exactly one of the  two 
is obligatory. In other cases, an  option m ay appear only if another option is also 
present. For example, the com m and name I s  (‘list names, properties etc. of files’) 
can be followed by the o p tio n  - t  (‘sort by tim e ra ther th an  alphabetically’); an 
o ther flag, -u , can also a p p ea r (‘sort by last access tim e ra th e r than  last modifi­
cation tim e’), bu t only if - t  is also present. Finally, under norm al circum stances, 
arguments m ay be optional only if the rem aining argum ents are also optional, be­
cause argum ents are only m arked  by their positions (they are not in troduced w ith 
option letters).
For the  sake of clarity, a  careful distinction is to be m ade between the  com­
m and language and the shell languages of an  operating system. The com m and 
language determ ines how programs stored in  the com puter can be invoked w ith 
various param eters. The shells, on the o ther hand, are command interpreters, 
i.e., program s which help th e  user issue com m ands by preprocessing h is /h e r in­
p u t command lines. Shells usually offer in teresting possibilities to the user, e.g., 
they  rem em ber where various programs are to  be found (for a faster invocation), 
they  rem em ber what com m ands have been issued earlier (so th a t it is easier to
7issue earlier com m ands again and again), they allow the user to use all so rts  of 
abbreviations for com m and lines, file names etc., they help the user invoke p ro ­
gram s one after the other, or in various combinations (for exam ple, they contain  
flow-of-control possibilities like the if . .. then ... construct), and they provide the  
user w ith built-in commands th a t do not correspond to separate  program s, b u t 
are carried out by the shell itself. For the sake of simplicity, the language th a t  I 
am talking about here is the command language ra ther than  any particu lar shell 
language.
2 .2 . T h e  N o n -C o m p o s it io n a lity  o f  U n ix  C o m m a n d s
As I m entioned in S ec t io n  1, the com positionality of an entire language is a 
gradual concept. It may happen th a t every single expression of a language is 
constructed using some special derivation. Such a language would satisfy the  
principle of com positionality in a vacuous way, since none of its expressions would 
be transparen t. However, it would be entirely non-com positional in the in tu itive  
sense, i.e., it would be very dissimilar to na tu ra l languages. The Unix com m and 
language constitu tes an interm ediate case: m ost com m and lines can be seen as 
having a m ore or less transparen t in terpretation, yet all users agree th a t th e ir  
sem antics is far from sim ilar to  the semantic of natural-language utterances.
W hat is the  reason why Unix commands ‘feel’ so non-com positional a t tim es? 
Obviously, this is due to the fact tha t, despite their fairly regular syntax (in the  
non-technical sense of ‘regular’), expressions in the same syntactic  position (even 
literally  identical expressions) fulfil very different functions from one com m and to  
the  other. T h a t is, b o th  the simple expressions (com m and nam es, flags, op tion  
letters) and their ways of com bination (being a first or second argum ent, being an 
option etc.) lack constant meanings. Let me present a few exam ples to illu s tra te  
this.
C om m and nam es may have multiple (vaguely related) functions. For exam ple, 
the com m and mount is used to a ttach  a data-storing device (such as a d a ta  disk) to 
the  file system  when it is followed by an argum ent, whereas it displays inform ation 
on the currently a ttached  data-storing devices when invoked w ithout an argum ent. 
The com m and sendm ail has many unrelated functions, such as sending m ail, 
rebuilding the database describing mail protocols, and so on.
The m eanings of flags may vary from one com m and nam e to the other. For 
exam ple, the flag -1  m eans ‘produce long, verbose listing’ when used w ith the  
com m and I s  (m entioned above), whereas it means ‘count lines only’ when it fol­
lows the com m and nam e wc (which is used for counting the num ber of lines, words 
a n d /o r  characters in a file). The flag -v  means ‘produce verbose o u tp u t’ w ith  
m any com m ands, whereas it m eans ‘display non-m atching ra th e r th an  m atch ing  
lines’ when used w ith g rep . As we have seen, - f  as an option le tte r may abbrev iate
8‘file’ (it precedes the n am e of an auxiliary file, such as one containing commands 
or expressions), but it s tan d s  for ‘force’ when used w ith rm (in which case various 
precautions are not tak en  by the rm program ).
T h ere  is no uniform ity as to w hat is expressed w ith an (obligatory or optional, 
first or second) argum ent or with an option. For exam ple, as we have seen, the 
expression that tells g re p  w hat strings to look for m ay appear in an option (pre­
ceded by -e )  or as an obligatory argum ent. The nam e of the target archive file of 
the t a r  archiving u tility  can only be expressed w ith an  option (‘- f  (file)’), while 
its argum ent is the nam e of the file to  be extracted from  or added to the archive. 
On the  o ther hand, as we have seen, the  nam e of the ta rge t is an argum ent of the 
com m and name make.
T h e  examples could be listed indefinitely. Everyone who has used Unix will 
know how  often the so-called manual pages (descriptions of the syntax and se­
m antics of each com m and) have to be  consulted in order to find out about the 
idiosyncratic properties of a  command. Clearly, the heterogeneous behaviour of 
the com m ands is due to  the  fact th a t each command nam e corresponds to a pro­
gram, an d  it is those program s ra th e r than  the shells or the operating system 
tha t deal w ith the param eters given in  the com m m and line. T hat is, it is w ithin 
the discretion of the program m er who creates those program s to define how they 
should behave. In o ther words, the in terpreta tion  of the  param eters is the ‘internal 
affair’ o f each individual program . The only way to constrain the heterogeneity of 
their in terpretation  is to  instruct the program m ers to  be more consistent.
However, the in te rp re ta tion  of the  Unix com m and language (and of other 
com puter command languages, for th a t  m atter) is trivially  compositional under 
the trad itiona l concept o f compositionality, since the  program s corresponding to 
the com m ands contain th e  definitions of the functions th a t they com pute, and the 
program s themselves a re  in terpreted compositionally. B ut those program s do all 
sorts o f ‘tricks’, falling in to  each of the  three classes th a t I m entioned in (2i-iii) 
in S e c t io n  1. That is, (i) they em body arb itrary  functions (any function tha t 
a com puter program can  compute); (ii) they have access to their param eters in 
the form  of character strings, which m eans th a t the compositional calculation of 
the m eaning of a com m and line m ust rely on an odd concept of ‘m eaning’; and 
(iii) th e  way in which ‘re a l’ meanings are assigned to the  param eters (e.g., the way 
in which a  character s trin g  is taken to  refer to a file) is not system atic (because it 
is also an  ‘internal affa ir’ of the program s invoked).
W e can see that th e  intuitive non-com positionality of command languages like 
th a t of Unix stems from  the weak points of the principle of com positionality as 
described in (2) in S e c t io n  1. If we were to build a shell sim ulating a  composi­
tional in terpretation for Unix commands, we should solve the general problem s of 
compositionality.7
7 W e have proposed a partial solution for this in Kálm án and R ádai (1994).
93. S tro n g  C o m p o sit io n a lity
In this section, I develop an alternative to the trad itional concept of com position­
ality. T he alternative will consist in adding two sub-principles to the trad itio n a l 
definition (see (1) in S e c tio n  1), called Independence and Additivity. The re su lt­
ing, m ore restrictive, principle will also be called Strong Compositionality. T he  
following sub-sections introduce these principles.
3 .1 . In d e p e n d e n c e
I will s ta r t  w ith  the problem  of assigning meanings to the sub-expressions o f an 
expression. We have seen th a t the intuitive non-com positionality of Unix com ­
m ands is p a rtly  due to the fact th a t the program  invoked is free to in te rp re t the  
param eters, depending on its idiosyncratic contents. The principle of com position­
ality (see (1) in S e c tio n  1) leaves it open how the sub-expressions of a com plex 
expression are assigned meanings. To satisfy the intuitively desired requirem ents 
of com positionality in a hypothetical Unix com m and language, the m eanings as­
signed to  the param eters m ust not depend on w hat the com m and nam e is and  
w hat the  o ther param eters are. T hat is, meanings m ust not be assigned in  a 
construction-specific m anner. I propose the following principle to achieve th is:
(3) Independence
T he meanings of the constituents of a complex expression are assigned 
independently  of each other, of the way in which they are p u t together, an d  
of the  function th a t yields the meaning of the complex expression.
If a language obeys Independence, then  the meaning of an expression m ay 
not vary depending on w hat it is a constituent of. Were we not to impose such a 
constraint, very similar constructs (e.g., containg the same expression in the  sam e 
syntactic role) could be in terpreted  in heterogeneous (or even unrelated) ways. 
Note th a t th is principle implies th a t the m eaning contributions of the constituen ts 
of an expression are constant, i.e., they do not vary from one construct to  the  
other. This m eans a certain  context-independence, which m any would deny. I 
conceive of th is  as a price to pay for a reasonable alternative to the trad itio n a l 
concept of compositionality.
The role of the external context in the in terpreta tion  of complex expressions 
is undeniable, b u t it is not a challenge to e ither Com positionality or Independence 
as long as we can reduce it to an influence on the assignment of m eanings to 
simple sub-expressions, and this seems perfectly feasible (cf. P artee  (1984)). O n 
the o ther hand , the principle of independence also does not prevent those meanings 
th a t the sub-expressions are assigned from interacting w ith each o ther to p roduce  
complex m eanings (cf. S e c tio n  4.2). We only want to exclude the dependency 
of the m eanings of complex expressions on the formal properties (shapes) of th e ir  
sub-expressions.
10
3.2. A d d it iv ity
The variab ility  of m eaning assignment is not the only reason why the meanings of 
com m and names and param eters  are no t constant in Unix commands. Even if we 
assume th e  principle of independence, the  programs invoked by these commands 
may deal w ith  the m eanings of the param eters in idiosyncratic ways, because they 
can do anything a co m pu ter program  can do. T hat is how, for exam ple, the 
program  mount may behave in two entirely  differently ways depending on w hether 
it is passed  an argum ent a t all. This peculiar, heterogeneous behaviour is not 
related to  th e  way in w hich  its eventual param eter is assigned a value.
To achieve a uniform  behaviour of commands, we should be able to stipulate 
th a t the  meaning con tribu tion  of the com m and name cannot be radically altered 
by the presence or absence of param eters, and the o ther way round, the  m eaning 
con tribu tion  of a p aram eter or a type of argument m ust not be radically altered  by 
the com m and that it is given to. This implies a non-destructive way of combining 
constituents: whatever each  constituent contributes to  the m eaning of the  entire 
complex expression m ust b e  constant from  one expression to the other. This can 
be form ulated  as a sep ara te  principle:
(4) A dditiv ity
T h e  function th a t  combines the  meanings of the  sub-expressions of a com­
p lex  expression m u s t not destroy the information contained in those m ean­
ings.
The nam e ‘additivity’ is m otivated  by the  fact tha t, if a function obeys th is p rin­
ciple, th e n  the meanings o f the sub-expressions are simply ‘sum m ed u p ’ in some 
technical sense of the w ord . Obviously, the definition presupposes a concept of 
information content for meanings. Usually, this kind of concept is defined by 
a ttr ib u tin g  an algebraic struc tu re  to the  domain(s) of meanings. The structu re  
must co n ta in  an ordering in  terms of informativity, and  an operation of combin­
ing pieces of information, which should not lead out of the structure . Assuming 
such a  concept, A dditivity means th a t the  combination of two members of such a 
domain m u st yield a th ird  member th a t  is ordered higher than  b o th  operands in 
the inform ativity hierarchy.
For example, assum e th a t  the m eaning (denotation) of the com m and nam e rra 
is a set o f processes the  on ly  effect of which is the removal of some file. To combine 
the m eaning  of rm w ith  th e  meaning of a param eter, the param eter in question 
must be assigned a m eaning  in the sam e domain. For example, an argum ent (file) 
could be assigned the set o f all processes that affect the file called (file), and the 
flag - f  could  denote all processes th a t do not take certain  precautions. Then the 
m eaning o f ‘rm - f  (file) ’ could be produced by taking the intersection of the  three 
sets. T h is  operation clearly  satisfies A dditivity if the domain of m eanings is the 
powerset o f possible processes.
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In general, A dditivity is always satisfied if the dom ain of m eanings is a pow- 
erset and the only operation th a t may combine m eanings is intersection. Note 
th a t A dditivity  presupposes th a t the meanings of the sub-expressions combined 
are of the sam e type (i.e., they are comparable in term s of the inform ativ ity  or­
dering). This is an unorthodox requirem ent, which calls for fu rther explanation 
and m otivation. I will tu rn  back to it in S e c tio n  4.
A dditivity  makes it very cumbersome to deal w ith non-m onotonicity , i.e., 
phenom ena in which so-called default values are involved. For exam ple, if we 
invoke the program  cc (which compiles source program s w ritten  in the  C language 
into object files) w ithout specifying w hat the o u tpu t (executable) file is to  be 
called, the compiler will create a file called a .o u t .  We can override th is  default 
nam e w ith the -o  option letter. Now, if we were to in terpre t cc as the  set of 
processes th a t result in compiling a source file into some object file, and  the  option 
‘-o  (objfile)’ as the processes in which the output file is (objfile), then  we get the 
correct in terp re ta tion  of their combination by just intersecting the two denotations. 
In th a t case, however, we will not get the right result for the  in te rp re ta tio n  of cc 
invoked w ithout a -o  option (in which case the o u tpu t file nam e is a .o u t ) .  On 
the o ther hand, if we were to build the name a . ou t into the denotation  of cc, 
then  the intersection w ith th a t set w ith the denotation of ‘-o  (objfile)’ would 
be em pty (unless (objfile) happens to be a .o u t) .  The form er set would contain 
processes in which the ou tpu t file is called a .o u t ,  and the other would possibly 
contain processes in which it is called differently. So A dditivity excludes those 
com binations of meanings in which one meaning destroys or blocks som e default 
inform ation associated w ith another. I will tu rn  back to th is problem  in a m om ent 
(in S e c tio n  3 .2 .1  below).
Note th a t the  denotation of ‘-o  (objfile)’ above is re la ted  to w hat a  certain  
file (referred to as ‘the ou tpu t file’ above) is called, and the denotation  of cc m ust 
involve the sam e file. Obviously, the semantic object corresponding to ‘the  ou tpu t 
file’ in the denotation  of cc m ust be a variable the value of which is to be (objfile) 
in term s of the  denotation  of ‘-o  (objfile)’. T hat is, we have to assum e th a t 
variables are present in the sem antic domains w ith respect to which com m ands 
are in terpreted  (e.g., in the states of the computer; in the  Unix operating  system, 
so-called environment variables can play this role). In w hat follows, the  term  
‘variable’ will refer to such objects ra ther than  variables in the  language of sem antic 
representations.
3 .2 .1 . D ea lin g  W ith  D efa u lts
As is clear from the above, Additivity makes it impossible to combine m eanings 
in such a way th a t one m eaning overrides the defaults associated w ith  another
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m eaning. As an example, I quo ted  Unix command lines like
cc -o  (objfile) (sourcefile),
w here the default object file nam e associated w ith  the com m and cc can be over­
rid d en  by the file nam e in troduced  with -o. Obviously, it is not possible to solve 
th is  problem by ju s t designing a  command in terpreter (a shell) which preprocesses 
th e  u ser’s input com m and lines and obeys strong com positionality.8 In particular, 
a  m eaning th a t would include a  piece of inform ation like ‘if there is no -o option 
in  m y command line, my o u tp u t file name is a .o u t ’, which we should assign to 
th e  com m and nam e cc, is p robab ly  not a possible meaning.
To treat cases like the above in an additive way, we m ust assum e more complex 
dom ains for m eanings (with th e  appropriate ordering in term s of inform ativity). 
For example, the  denotation of the command nam e cc has to contain the set 
corresponding to  its underspecified meaning (in which the nam e of the ou tpu t 
file is not specified), plus an  indication on how default values can be provided if 
necessary. T h a t is, I propose a  separation of meanings from  sources of default 
values: the denotation  of a program  name is to  be an ordered pair (S , V), where 
S  is the set of processes corresponding to the largely underspecified meaning, 
w hereas V  is some indication of how default values can be produced.9 For the 
sake o f simplicity, we can say th a t  V  is an assignment function assigning (default) 
values to variables.
Technically speaking,
V  C Var x ( J  £>(r),
rSTYPE
w here  Var is th e  set of variables (as semantic objects, as I explained in S ec­
t i o n  3 .2), T Y P E  is the set o f types, and D is the function th a t assigns a dom ain 
to  each  type. Since V  is a function, we have
(x,<*),(x,ß) € V => a = /?;
so we can say
V( x)  =def { " if ( x ,a )  € V; 
elsewhere
8 This is a  lim itation th a t  we had to face in our earlier paper m entioned in 
footnote 7.
9 The two components can  be seen as the committing  vs. deferred inform ation 
content of denotations, as explained in Kálm án (1990).
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(assum ing th a t * £ U rg T Y P E  -^(r ))- Obviously, we also stipulate  th a t, if x T G V arr 
(i.e., if x is a variable of type r ) ,  then
V ( x r ) e  D( t ),
i.e., V  assigns an object of the appropriate type to each variable. T he ‘in tersec tion’ 
of the two pairs P\ — (S j, Vj) and P2 =  (S2, Vj), w ritten  Pi n  P 2 , can be defined 
as follows:
P \ n  P 2 = def (*Sj 0  S j ,  Vj +  V j) ,
where Vj +  V2  s tands for the ‘com bination’ of the valuations Vj and  Vj, defined as 
follows:
Vj +  Vj = d e f  { (x ,a )  G Vj U Vj: / \ ( x , ß )  G Vj U Vj a  =  ß}.
ß
T h a t is, we take the union of Vj and Vj w ithout those ordered pairs th a t assign 
incom patible values to the same variable. The inform ativity ordering over ordered 
pairs of the form  ( S ,V)  can now be defined as
Pi <  p2 ^def Pl fl P2 =  Pi .
T h a t is, P i is more inform ative than P 2 if its first component is a  subset of the  
first com ponent of P 2, and its valuation is a  subset of the valuation in P 2.
Now, assum ing th a t the first component of Pi is the set of processes corre­
sponding to the underspecified meaning of cc, and the first com ponent of P 2 is the  
set of processes in which the ou tpu t file is called (objfile), then the first com ponent 
of P i n  P 2 is exactly the set of processes th a t we want ‘cc -o  (objfile)’ to denote, 
irrespective of w hat its second component contains.
As a m a tte r of fact, default values may be layered in such a way th a t assigning 
a default value to  a variable changes the default values available for o ther variables. 
Therefore, in actual fact, the second com ponent, which produces default values, 
should be enriched. For example, it could be a set of nodes in a default inheritance 
hierarchy from  which default values can be inherited if necessary. I will not dwell 
on th is possibility here, because it is not directly relevant to the issue of s trong  
compositionality.
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3.3. S tron g  C o m p o s it io n a lity
The definition of strong compositionality is the conjunction of Com positionality, 
Independence and A dditiv ity . I subm it Strong Compositionality as an alternative 
to the principle of com positionality.
(5) Strong Compositionality
T he meaning of a  complex expression is strongly com positional if and only 
if it obeys
(i) the Principle o f Compositionality (cf. (1) in Section  1);
(ii) the Principle o f Independence (cf. (3) in S ectio n  3.1); and
(iii) the Principle o f A dditivity (cf. (4) in S ec t io n  3.2).
It should be clear from  th e  above th a t the three sub-principles are independent. 
Notice how the weaknesses of Compositionality (cf. (2) in S ection  1) are rem edied 
by S trong Compositionality. Additivity is an answer to the arb itra ry  character of 
com bination functions (cf. (2i)), and Independence constrains the assignm ent of 
meanings to simple sub-expressions (cf. (2iii)). As I m entioned earlier, the th ird  
weakness of Com positionality (i.e., the  arbitrary character of meanings, cf. (2ii)) 
is probably  harmless if th e  two other problems are discarded.
4. S tro n g  C o m p o s it io n a lity  in  N atu ra l L anguage
This section deals w ith  some consequences of Strong Com positionality on the 
sem antics of natural language. F irst, in  Section 4.1, I will examine the effect of 
A dditivity  (and Strong Com positionality in general) on common views of sem antic 
com bination and types, a n d  I will conclude that the trad itional (Fregean) m etaphor 
o f ‘incom plete’ linguistic expressions as functors and ‘complete’ ones as operands is 
to be abandoned. Second, in  Section  4.2, I will say a few words how the meanings 
of sub-expressions can interact during the  process of additive meaning com position 
to produce the m eanings of complex expressions. Finally, in S ec t io n  4.3, I will 
sketch a  technical so lu tio n  for combining meanings w ithout m aking reference to 
‘globally available’ variab le  names. This will involve an operation called coalesced 
intersection, and I will a lso  elaborate on what kind of semantic dom ains we might 
need for the  in terpre ta tion  of natural-language expressions.
4 .1 . A b a n d o n in g  t h e  F u n cto r  M etap h or
I have touched upon various consequences of Strong Com positionality on natural- 
language semantics a lready. In particu lar, I argued th a t the idiom atic aspects 
of expressions must be  accounted for in terms of special ways of com bination 
(in S e c t io n  1), and I argued th a t the  influence of expression-internal contexts 
on in terpretation are d u e  either to genuine ambiguity or underspecification (in
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S e c tio n  3 .1 .1 ). In this section, I will dwell on a very p a rticu la r consequence 
of S trong Com positionality, originating from the principle of additivity. If the 
com bination of the meanings of constituents is to be additive in  the  technical sense 
explained in S e c tio n  3 .5 , then the denotations of the im m ediate constituents of a 
complex expressions m ust be com parable in term s of inform ativity. Were they  not, 
we could not perform  intersection-like operations on them. T his implies th a t  the 
trad itiona l functor/operand metaphor of combining meanings m ust be abandoned.
In the  in terp re ta tion  mechanism th a t I have proposed for Unix com m and 
lines, b o th  the nam e of a com m and and the option a ttached  to  it denote sets of 
processes (or more complex structures th a t contain them  as com ponents). Note, 
however, th a t an option on its own is not complete in the syntactic  sense: no op tion  
occurs w ithout a com m and name. In the trad itional fu nc to r/operand  approach, 
an incom plete expression m ust be a functor, which can be com pleted by providing 
it w ith  the operands th a t it expects.10 T hat is, options should be tran sla ted  as 
functions expecting denotations of command names and yielding denotations of 
com m and lines. B ut, in general, functors are of different types th an  their operands. 
So A dditiv ity  seems to exclude the functor/operand  m etaphor.
A bandoning the functo r/operand  m etaphor raises two problem s:
(6) Problems with A dditiv ity
(i) syntactic  obligatoriness cannot be expressed in term s of sem antic in ­
completeness; and
(ii) sem antic incompleteness cannot be expressed in term s of functional 
types (expecting argum ents).
The problem  in (6i) does not seem too big a price to pay for A dditivity. In cases 
like th a t of com m and nam es and options in Unix commands, the  obligatoriness of 
a com m and nam e in com m and lines has to be stated  somehow, anyway, an d  the 
fact th a t options do not occur on their own will follow from th a t statem ent. As 
a  m a tte r  of fact, in m ost n a tu ra l languages, adjuncts can occur on their own as 
u tterances.
The problem  in (6ii) looks more serious at first sight. How can we tell from  
the  denotation  of, say, a verb, i f i t  is complete w ithout ‘in tersecting’ it w ith th e  de­
no ta tion  of an argum ent? W hat is it in the denotation of a determ iner th a t m akes 
it so incom plete th a t determ iners seldom occur on their own in n a tu ra l languages? 
The functo r/argum ent m etaphor explains this type of facts very straightforw ardly, 
to the  extent th a t it seems alm ost unquestionable. For example, if a  verb expresses 
a relation  betw een two entities, then it is only na tu ra l th a t its  occurrences are in ­
com plete unless it is complemented w ith two other expressions, denoting entities.
10 The idea th a t syntactically incomplete expressions are to  be considered 
functors originates from Frege (1870).
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I propose a radical so lu tion  to this problem. M aybe ‘semantic com pleteness’ 
is not an indispensable concept at all. If we are ready to  accept a m odel in which 
meanings are ordered in te rm s  of informativity, it is not clear at all w hether we have 
to  posit th e  existence of ‘com plete’ m eanings on formal, ontological or linguistic 
grounds. In  formal term s, it is certainly possible th a t the  algebraic s truc tu re  of 
meanings is not atomic, i.e., there need no t be any meanings in the s tru c tu re  th a t 
can only be  enriched in such  a  way th a t a  contradiction arises. A lthough it is not 
ontologically implausible th a t  certain entities in the m odel are ‘com plete’, it is not 
a t all clear whether any linguistic expression, even a large piece of discourse, can 
successfully denote such an  entity. In sum , I see no compelling reason why the 
Fregean theory, in which sentences and individual nam es are ‘com plete’, should be 
adopted.
In te rm s of this rad ica l solution, a  transitive verb w ith missing argum ents 
or a determ iner without a  noun  are never semantically, bu t at m ost syntactically 
incom plete. This need n o t imply a ‘m ism atch’ between semantic and  syntactic 
struc tu re , however. In th e  same way as a Unix com m and line m ust s ta r t w ith 
a  com m and name syntactically, and is system atically associated w ith  a type of 
m eanings, uttering a tran sitiv e  verb phrase may syntactically require the  u tte rance  
of a transitive  verb and a  d irec t object, and  denote a certain  type of states of affairs. 
If there is any ‘m ism atch’ a t all between syntactic and semantic struc tu res (from 
this perspective), it is betw een the ‘com pleteness’ properties of certain  syntactic 
constructs and their sem an tic  counterparts: ‘incompleteness’ may m ake sense for 
some syntactic  constructs, b u t not for the  corresponding semantic objects.
4 .2 . In tera ctio n  o f  M ea n in g s
A lthough Independence prohibits the meanings assigned to sub-expressions from  
depending on each o ther, there  are clear cases when the  meanings of sub-expres­
sions interact in the process of in terpretation. For example, consider the  following 
expressions:
(7) Uses of coffee
a. some ground coffee
‘some ground coffee (seeds)’
b. a hot coffee
‘a  hot coffee (liq u id )’
c. a quick coffee
‘a  coffee p re p a red /co n su m ed /... quickly’
d. after a coffee
‘after consuming a coffee’
These expressions illu s tra te  what we m ight call productive ambiguity: it is very 
common for names of p lan ts  (like coffee) to stand for their consumable p a rts  (like
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coffee beans) as well as its derivatives in various stages of p reparation  (like the 
roasted  seeds and  the  liquid in (7a-b)). On the o ther hand, nouns referring to 
food quite often take modifiers tha t refer to their p reparation  or consum ption (as 
quick in (7c)), and  the nouns themselves may stand  for the consum ption of the 
food in question (as coffee in (7d)). If, however, we assigned the m eanings ‘quickly 
p repared ’ or ‘quickly consum ed’ to quick in (7c) or the m eaning ‘consum ption of 
coffee’ to coffee in (7d), we would violate Independence. It is also clear th a t we 
would ‘miss generalizations’ if we were to trea t the ambiguities in (7) as accidental 
surface coincidences (homonymy). On the o ther hand, since the form al properties 
of the  sub-expressions play no role in the in terpreta tion  of the above exam ples, it 
m ust be possible to explain ‘productive am biguities’ of this sort w ithou t violating 
Independence.
Q uite obviously, languages like the Unix com m and language do no t exhibit 
phenom ena like the  ‘productive am biguities’ in (7), because these phenom ena stem  
from  the  im portan t role of implicitness in natural-language in te rp re ta tion . The 
exam ples in (7) are compact expressions corresponding to  more com plex m ean­
ings, which no com petent speaker would have any trouble to paraphrase. On the 
o ther hand, there is some non-determinism  in the in terpreta tion  of such com pact 
expressions. For example, it is not absolutely excluded for hot coffee in  (7b) to 
s tan d  for ‘hot coffee pow der’ or ‘hot coffee beans’ in certain  contexts.
W hat the exam ples in (7) show, then, is th a t natural-language m eanings can 
be combined in m ore than  one way, and how exactly the hearer is supposed to 
proceed is often left implicit by the speaker. Both the fact th a t com petent speakers 
can produce equivalent, more explicit paraphrases and the  fact th a t th e  actual 
choice of the paraphrase is not entirely determ ined indicate tha t the  processes 
involved are sim ilar to other cases related to implicit inform ation. For exam ple, 
it is usually left im plicit why two sentences are pu t one after the o ther in  a  piece 
of discourse (because they are part of the same story, they support th e  same 
argum ent, etc.). Similarly, definite descriptions are usually com pact descriptions 
th a t can be m ade m ore explicit by attaching relative clauses to them . In  sum , the 
process of in terpreting  expressions like those in (7) involves som ething very sim ilar 
to certain  discourse processes in which the speaker expects the hearer to  establish  
‘missing links’ such as anaphoric and rhetorical relations.
This suggests th a t combining the meanings of natural-language expressions 
may involve more th an  the simple ‘intersection’ operation th a t I have proposed in 
connection w ith Unix commands. The meanings assigned to the constituen ts of 
such expressions are processed and brought into harm ony w ith each o th e r before 
‘in tersecting’ them . We can th ink  of this ‘pre-processing’ as analogous to  those 
phonological processes (e.g., assimilation) which affect the lexical phonem es when 
they en ter into contact through affixation. M ost im portantly, A dditiv ity  requires
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the  pre-processing operations to be non-destructive. For example, in the expres­
sions in (7), it m ust be possible to derive the meanings of coffee (and quick) from 
m ore abstract (less specific) meanings. T hat is, using the phonological m etaphor, 
phenom ena analogous to genuine morphological (not phonologically m otivated) 
stem  or affix a lternation  are excluded from semantics.
W hat does the  difference between Unix commands and natural-language ex­
pressions lie in? As I said earlier, in S ectio n  3 .2 , an analysis of Unix com m and 
lines th a t respects A dditiv ity  must posit variables th a t both  command names 
an d  options have access to. For example, the  definition of cc makes reference 
to  the  variable corresponding to ‘the ou tpu t file’ (called, say, OUTPUTFILE), and 
the  meaning of the option ‘-o  (objfile)’ assigns a value to the same variable. I 
also mentioned, in S ec tio n  3 .2 .1 , th a t the definition of cc may assign a  default 
value to the sam e variable, which can be retrieved if necessary. W hat I have not 
dealt with so far, though, is how  and when such default values are assigned. In 
practice, it is the  program  cc which, when invoked, checks for relevant param eters 
and  assigns default values if none is present. Be it as it may, we can th ink  of this 
process as if a program  different from cc was invoked, one in which the value of the 
variable OUTPUTFILE is set to  its default value. Such a different cc program  would 
qualify as an instance of the original, as its denotation would be more informative 
th a n  tha t of the  original.
It is clear th a t, since the  in terpretation  of Unix commands is the ‘internal 
affa ir’ of the program s th a t they invoke, the  in terpreta tion  process m ust lack a 
m echanism  of the above sort, i.e., a module th a t would deal with the assignment 
of default values by creating or invoking various instances of programs. On the 
o th e r hand, we are free to posit such mechanisms for the in terpretation of natural- 
language expressions if we can justify them. For example, we could say th a t the 
default value of the  direct object of the verb leave is the reference location:
(8) Default direct object o f leave
a. I  haven’t seen him. Maybe he left already.
‘M aybe he left here already’
b. He went to Paris, but he left already.
‘He left Paris already’
We could also say th a t some interpretation mechanism converts the m eaning as­
signed to leave into an instance of tha t m eaning, in which the variable corre­
sponding to the  direct object is assigned the reference location as a value. As this 
qualifies as an instan tiation , it does not contradict Additivity (no inform ation gets 
destroyed).
The instan tia tion  m echanism  has nothing to  do w ith Independence, which 
only constrains the  context-dependency of m eaning assignment. So the in stan tia­
tio n  of meanings is free to be sensitive to the  internal context. T hat is, a  strongly
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com positional analysis o f ‘productive am biguities’ (cf. (7)) would be feasible if only 
we could do it in term s of this kind of mechanism.
Obviously, the examples in (7) are not similar to the working of the cc com ­
m and in Unix. For example, it would be difficult to argue th a t the  denotation  of 
coffee refers to a variable th a t the denotation of quick also m entions. In p a rtic u ­
lar, we do not want to say tha t the denotation of coffee is necessarily re lated  to  a 
particu lar process w ith regard to which ‘quick’ makes sense at all (cf. the exam ples 
(7a-b), which show no trace of any process). On the o ther hand , by relying on 
the (lexical or encyclopedic) knowledge th a t coffee is prepared and  drunk by peo­
ple, such processes are somehow licensed. The licensing process can be analogous 
to w hat the  instan tia tion  would do to the program  cc in our hypothetical Unix 
com m and in terpreter. T h a t is, we can assume th a t the denotation  of coffee con­
tains some indication on how to assign default values to a variable th a t expresses 
‘w hat we do w ith coffee’, and the instantiation process assigns one of the default 
values. (T he existence of multiple default values is a separate, unrelated  issue.) 
Then quick m ay modify th a t process in the same way as ‘-o  (objfile)’ does to  ‘the  
ou tpu t file’ w ith cc. This is why a quick window does not seem to  m ake m uch 
sense unless m aybe in a workshop where the relevant variable can be assigned a 
default value (i.e., there is a typical process a ffec tin g /c rea tin g /.. .  windows, as in 
a carpen ter’s workshop).
The o ther examples in (7) can be explained in an analogous m anner. We can 
assume th a t, in the prototypical (‘intersective’) adjectival m odification s tructu res 
exemplified in (7a-b ), the adjective usually modifies a relevant p a r t of w hat the  
noun denotes, as in pink grapefruit ‘pink on the inside’ vs. pink apple ‘pink on the  
outside’ (cf. Quine (1960), Partee (1984)). So, in these cases, it seems th a t we 
have to in stan tia te  the denotation of the adjective ra ther th an  th a t of the n o u n .11 
W hat p a rt (or, in the case of coffee, w hat stage) of an object is relevant for the  
adjective to  modify depends on the noun, bu t yields a specialized denotation  of 
the adjective (which often lexicalizes as such, like adjectives referring to colours 
of hum an skin or hair in m any languages). Finally, after coffee in  (7d) makes it 
necessary to  instan tia te  the denotation of coffee (so th a t a process affecting the  
coffee appears in it explicitly). The analogy of (7c) and (7d) is also shown by 
the fact th a t the same class of nouns can occur in both  contexts (after quick and  
after).
For some other examples of interactions of meanings, let m e have a quick 
look at verbs and their arguments. The phrase eat the grapefruit usually is no t
11 The difference between the in terpretation  of various types of ad jec tive /noun  
constructs is not predicted by K eenan’s (1974) ‘functional princip le’, which 
says th a t the in terpreta tion  of a functor may depend on its operand, b u t no t 
vice versa. This should not bother us a t all, since we have ju s t abandoned 
the fu nc to r/operand  m etaphor.
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in terp re ted  as eating th e  fru it w ithout leaving anything from  it, bu t as ‘eating the 
edible p a r t  of it’. As a  m a tte r  of course, the definite description in this paraphrase 
is alm ost always left im plic it, to the extent tha t we can almost think of it as p a rt 
of the lexical meaning o f eat. But in m any cases the  relationship between a  verb 
and a  certa in  type of argum ent varies depending on the  argum ent. For exam ple, 
consider:
(9) Ambiguity o f bake
a. I  baked a cake.
‘I created a cake by baking’
^ ‘1 subjected a  cake to dry heat on a hot surface’
b. I  baked a potato.
# ‘I created a  p o ta to  by baking’
‘I subjected a  p o ta to  to dry heat on a hot surface’
The re la tio n  between bake and its direct object is one of creation in (9a), whereas 
it is a  re la tion  of affection in (9b). We could take e ither bake or the gram m atical 
relation ‘direct object o f’ to  be ambiguous, and let the  implausible in terpretations 
(m arked w ith a *#’ above) be filtered out by some m echanism. On the o ther hand, 
we could also think o f th e  two cases in (9a) vs. (9b) as triggering two different 
in stan tiations of the deno ta tion  of bake. In the ‘correct’ in terpretation of (9a), the 
ab strac t meaning of bake is enriched in such a way th a t a variable corresponding 
to the  ob ject produced is explicitly present in it, and  the  interpretation of ‘direct 
object o f ’ is perfectly w illing to affect such objects, ju s t like the option le tte r -o  
is w illing to affect o u tp u t files. In the  same way, in the  preferred in terpre ta tion  
of (9b), we produce an  instance of ‘bake’ in which the  variable th a t we explicitly 
in troduce is the m ain ingredient of the  food prepared, and the relation ‘direct 
object o f’ is again w illing to  take it to  be the object m ost directly affected. The 
concept of ‘explicit in tro d u c tio n ’ will be clarified to  some extent in the next section.
I am  aware th a t th e  analyses presented in th is section are much too sketchy 
and far from  complete. Rem em ber th a t their m ain point is simply th a t we need not 
violate e ither Independence or Additivity to account for the interactions of m ean­
ings if  we can think o f th e  processes involved as instantiation, i.e., specification 
operations, which lead to  more informative denotations.
4 .3 . C oa lesced  In te r se c t io n
In S e c t io n  3.2 we have seen how the meanings of the command name cc and 
the option ‘-o (objfile)’ can be combined through intersection: cc denotes the 
set o f computations that compile a C source file into some object file, namely, 
the one referred to by the value of some distinguished variable, say, OUTPUTFILE, 
and ‘-o  (objfile)’ denotes the set of processes in which the value of OUTPUTFILE 
is set to  (objfile) for the time of the computation. Obviously, the intersection
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of these two m eanings yields the expected result because they b o th  refer to  the 
variable OUTPUTFILE. We cannot always proceed in this way, however, because it 
is not always the  case th a t the meaning of each constituent specifies how exactly it 
contributes to the  meanings of complex expressions. For example, the  constituents 
of ‘-o  (objfile)’ are -o  and (objfile), and the denotation of the la tte r  does not 
indicate w hat role the file th a t it refers to will play in complex m eanings. It 
is the  fact th a t it acts as an argum ent of -o  th a t determines its role. Thus, it 
would be tem pting  to  consider -o  a functor and (objfile) its operand. B u t we said 
earlier th a t it is undesirable to allow for function application as a way of combining 
m eanings, so a  different solution is called for.
The solution I propose is to introduce ad hoc distinguished variables in such 
cases, thereby im ita ting  the ‘norm al’ way of combining meanings seen above. To 
introduce such ‘local’ distinguished variables, we will use the A -notation, so th a t 
the m eanings of -o  and  (objfile) will be represented as follows:
(10) Meanings with local variables
a. Meaning o f -  o: Ax [OUTPUTFILE =  x],
b. Meaning o f  (objfile): Ay[y =  (objfile)].
Here the square brackets abbreviate th a t we are talking about a set o f com puta­
tions during which the expression(s) th a t they enclose hold. T hat is, th e  m eaning 
of -o  is a function from the values of x to the processes in which th e  value of 
OUTPUTFILE is identical to the value of x, and  the meaning of (objfile) is a func­
tion from  the values of y to the set of processes in which the value of y is (objfile). 
Obviously, although the above meanings are functions, we are m ainly in te rested  in 
their ranges (co-dom ains), i.e., the sets of processes th a t their bodies denote. On 
the o ther hand, the  simple intersection of the two sets of processes would no t yield 
the desired result, i.e., the meaning of ‘-o  (objfile)’: it would give us th e  set of 
processes in which OUTPUTFILE is assigned some value, and (objfile) is th e  value of 
some variable. W h at we want is a set of processes in the values of b o th  functions 
applied to the same argum ent, which ensures th a t OUTPUTFILE is assigned a value 
identical to  (objfile). The operation tha t produces this set will be called coalesced 
intersection. T he coalesced intersection of the meanings of -o  and (objfile) above 
m ust be som ething equivalent to
(11) Meaning o f  ‘-o  (objfile)’
Xz[z = OUTPUTFILE =  (objfile)].
As can be seen, the basic equivalence th a t we want to hold for coalesced 
intersection is the  following (the symbol ‘©’ stands for coalesced in tersection):
(12) Basic equivalence for Coalesced Intersection
Xx(tp) © Ay(ip) = Xz(v?[x/z] A ip[y/z])
whenever z does no t occur free in either or ip. (As usual, ipfx/z] is th e  sam e as 
<p, w ith  the free occurrences of x replaced w ith z.) To ensure this equivalence, we 
need to define the sem antic value of coalesced intersection as follows:
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(13) Coalesced Intersection
[ f ® 9 Í v  =def {(a,ß)-  I / lv (a )  n fc ]v(a )  =  ß},  
w here |* |v is the  sem antic-value function th a t assigns denotations to  expressions 
for any assignment v.
We can prove th a t the equivalence in (12) holds using the s tandard  definition 
of th e  A-operator, and  taking conjunction to m ean intersection:
(14) Proof o f (12)
1 . [Aa:(v?)Iv = def { (a ,/?): M„[x:a] = ß},
where v[x : a] is the same as v except that it assigns a to x:
” 1* : “ K») = d"  { v(y) o theiw lk
2. [Ax(^) © Ay(rp)jv =  {{a,ß):  |Ax((p)lv(a ) n  [Ay(i/>)|„(a) =  ß}  
by the definition in (13), which is the  same as
{(<*,/?): n  I l^w[y:or] =  ß}
by the definition in  (14.1) above. This is the semantic value of the  left- 
hand side of the equivalence in (12).
3. [<p[x/z\Jv =  [¥>]»[*:»(*)]
if z does not occur free in ip. This is trivial.
4. [<p[x/z] A rj>[y/z] ]„ =  Iv?]„[*:V(,)] n  I01w[y:w(*)]
by the  in te rp re ta tion  of conjunction and using (14.3) above.
5. [Az(ip[x/z] A rp[y/z])\v =  [<p[x/z\ A rp[y/z\ =  ß}
by the  definition in  (14.1) above. This is the same as
{ { ^ i ß ) -  fl [V’lv[z:a][j(:v(r)] ß}
by (14.4) above. Now, using the definition of v[x : a] in (14.1) above, it 
is easy to  see th a t
I/Jv[z:a!][x:v(z)] 1 /J v[:r:a]
if 0 does not occur free in / .  Since we have assumed in (12) th a t z  does 
not occur free in either <p or xp, we can use this equivalence to  reduce the 
sem antic value of the  right-hand side of (12) to 
{{a , ß ) : M]r[x:a] H =  ß },
which is identical to the semantic value of the left-hand side, as can be 
seen in (14.2). Q.E.D.
As a m a tte r of fact, we can even use coalesced intersection for combining 
m eanings which could also be combined w ith simple intersection. I will assume 
th a t  A-abstraction can be p a rt of the ‘harm onization’ process m entioned in S ec­
t io n  4.2. So the  m eaning of the  command nam e cc, which is a set of com putations, 
can  be converted into som ething equivalent to
(15) Meaning o f cc
Ax[cc' A OUTPUTFILE =  x],
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which can be combined w ith the meaning of ‘-o  (objfile)’ (see (11) above) using 
coalesced intersection:
(16) Meaning o f  ‘cc -o  (objfile)’
Aa;[cc' A OUTPUTFILE = x] © Az[z = OUTPUTFILE =  (objfile)] =
=  Au[cc' A u = OUTPUTFILE =  (objfile)].
Obviously, in term s of the definition in (13), coalesced intersection is defined 
for any two functions th a t assign sets to the sam e type of entities. If the dom ain  of 
denotations is ordered in term s of informativity, and an intersection-type o p era tio n  
is defined for its elem ents (i.e., we have an operation th a t produces the  jo in t 
inform ation content of two elements), as we have assumed, then we can generalize 
coalesced intersection to functions which m ap to  th a t domain. Therefore, we m u st 
be able to use coalesced intersection as the basic operation for combining n a tu ra l-  
language m eanings as well.
The sem antics of Unix commands is much more complex than  I have sketched 
so far. In an earlier paper, we proposed ordered quadruples to  characterize sets  of 
processes in a radically simplified model;12 if we add default m echanisms (cf. S e c ­
t io n  3 .2 .1 ), the situation  becomes even m ore complex. But, for obvious reasons, 
the sem antics of n a tu ra l language has enorm ous complexities when com pared to 
Unix com m ands.
The semantic domains th a t underlie the  in terpre ta tion  of n a tu ra l languages 
are much m ore complex than  those in the Unix com m and language. W hile the  
la tte r consists of ‘m achine s ta te s ’ (basically, file structures, in which each file has 
certain  a ttrib u te s , such as its nam e and the character string it contains), the  m o d ­
els th a t we need for in terpreting  natural languages include various possible worlds 
(hypothetical or real, actual or past/fu tu re) in which various individuals (and , 
eventually, groups of individuals, if they have properties th a t are not p red ic tab le  
from  those of the ir m em bers) exist, various relations hold for them . These possible 
worlds are also dynamic in the sense that they m ay also change in tim e, which cor­
responds to the various eventualities that we can talk about in na tu ra l languages. 
(This type of dynam ism  is not to be confused w ith the one to be touched u p o n  
prom ptly.)
In m odern form al sem antics (called dynamic sem antics), n a tu ra l language 
meanings are seen as instructions for the hearer to update h is /h e r information  
state  about entities in the model. So we can th ink  of denotations as sets of u p d a tes
12 In K álm án and Rádai (1994), a set of processes is characterized by (i) an  
assignm ent function expressing the local environment of the com putation; 
(ii) a set of preconditions for the execution; (iii) a form ula describing th e  
maximal change effected by the process; and (iv) an environment change 
corresponding to the list of variables the  values of which may change as a 
result of the  com putation.
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in the sam e way as U nix command lines denote sets of com putations, which may 
change inform ation s ta tes  ju s t like com putations change machine states. B ut an 
inform ation state  is m uch more complex than  a machine state, because it is not a 
complete description o f a  model, bu t some representation of w hat inform ation is 
available abou t it.
Owing to  all these complexities, the  deferred information content of a  natural- 
language denotation (if we posit such a thing, as was suggested in S e c tio n  3 .2 .1) 
is also m uch larger an d  m uch complex th an  what we need for the in terpreta tion  
of Unix commands. It m ust encode a  large body of linguistic and non-linguistic 
(scientific and  cultural) knowledge th a t may influence interactions of m eanings (cf. 
S e c tio n  4 .2 ).
In sum , the com plexities of natural-language semantics are enorm ous. So 
enormous, in fact, th a t  they  prevent me from presenting short and illustrative 
examples of the use o f coalesced intersection, even simple examples like those 
th a t I have presented from  the Unix com m and language. In w hat follows, I will 
try  to ju s t point at som e features of the  syntax/sem antics interface th a t Strong 
Com positionality requires.
Ju s t the  same as in  the  in terpretation  of Unix command nam es and  param e­
ters, which we in terp re ted  as functions m apping to the same domain (namely, tha t 
of sets of processes), natural-language meanings will also be functions th a t m ap to 
the sam e domain. Ignoring the complexities of th a t domain, let us sim ply think of 
it as a  struc tu re  of pieces of inform ation about first-order models. We can think 
of such a  piece of inform ation as a set of model fragments, which represent partial 
inform ation on models com patible w ith  the current information s ta te .13 W hat we 
ignore in  th is way includes (i) deferred inform ation altogether (i.e., the interaction 
of m eanings will be done by deus ex machina)', (ii) the dynamic aspect of m od­
els (so I will assume th a t  we are talking about static states of affairs); (iii) the 
possibility of talking ab o u t various possible worlds (the assum ption being th a t the 
u tterances are about one single possible world). For the sake of completeness, here 
is the definition of a  first-order model:
13 Given the way we will define it, the concept of a  model fragm ent can be 
seen as a form al rendering of the  concept of situations in K ratzer (1986), 
B erm an (1987) an d  Heim (1990).
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(17) First-Order Models
A4 =  (7/, X) is a first-order model of language £  iff
1. U 0 (U is the universe of the model);
2. I  C  Con x U rgT Y P E  D(r,U),  where Con =  (JrgTY PE Con,- is the set 
of non-logical constants in £ , T Y P E  is the set of types (to  be defined 
below), and D{t ,U)  is the domain of type r  given the universe U. X  is 
called the interpretation function of the model;
4. If (a, a) E X, and (a ,ß ) E X, then a — ß. T h a t is, X is a function.
3. If a E Conr , and (a, a) E X, then a  E D( t ,U).  T hat is, X m aps non- 
logical constants of type r  to an element of the domain of r .
(18) Types
The set T Y P E  of types is the smalles set such th a t
(i) e E TY PE;
(ii) t E TY PE;
(iii) If a  E TY PE, and ß  E TY PE, then (a,ß)  E TY PE.
(19) Domains o f types
T he domain of a type r  given a universe U, w ritten  D( t ,U),  is defined as
follows:
(i) D ( e ,U ) =def U. T h a t is, e is the type of individuals.
(ii) D(t ,U)  =def {0, . T ha t is, t is the type of truth values, w ith the
em pty set and the entire universe representing false and  truth, respec­
tively. (Note th a t false and true coincide when U is em pty; this m ay 
never be the case when U is the universe of a model.)
(ill) D ( (c¥, /?) , 77) ^def D(°i,U) D[ß,U).  T hat is, (a ,ß)  is the  type of func­
tions m apping from the domain of a  to the dom ain of ß.
Now we are ready to define w hat a model fragm ent is:
(20) Model fragments
If A4 = (77, X) is a first order model, then (U, I)  is a model fragment over
^ ( w r i t t e n  (U, I)  E P m ) if and only if:
(i) U CU ;
(ii) I  is an interpretation function w ith respect to U, as we have seen in 
the definition of first-order models (see (17));
(iii) If a E C one, then (a,u)  E X if and only if (a,u)  E X, and u E U\
(iv) If p E Con«, then (p,a)  E U if and only if (p, ß)  E X for some ß  such 
th a t either (a) a — ß  =  0 or (b) a = U and ß  — U\
(v) If P  E C onr (for r  ^ {e, t}),  then (P,&) E 7 if and only if (P, ß) E X 
for some ß  such th a t a  =  ß C\ D( t ,U).  T h a t is, if the in te rp re ta tio n  of 
a constant is a function in the dom ain of r ,  then  we only keep those 
ordered pairs from it which also figure in the  domain of r  restric ted  to 
U.
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As a m atter of course, we will need an inform ativity ordering over sets of 
model fragments. This will be som ewhat more complex th an  the  subset relation. 
To define it properly, we will first define the relation over model fragments:
(21) Informativity o f model fragments
If ifi =  (Ui , I \ )  and — {U2 1 I 2 ) are model fragm ents, then  if\ if2  
(read: l(fi is at least as informative as if 2 ') if and only if <f \ is a  first-order 
model, and if 2  £ T Vl, i.e., if if 2 is itself a model fragm ent w ith regard to 
¥>i-
We can now define the  relation ‘< ’ over sets of model fragments:
(22) Informativity
If $ 1  and $ 2  are  sets of m odel fragments, then $ 1  <  $ 2  (read: ‘$ 1  is at 
least as informative as $ 2 ’) if and only if
A V Vh - T  V t -
tpi <E$1 <P2G*&2
T h at is, $ 1  contains a t m ost those model fragments th a t figure in $ 2 , bu t possibly 
less (leaving less possibilities open); and possibly contains m ore informative 
versions of some fragm ents in $ 2 -
It should be now possible to  show th a t an expression th a t is syntactically 
‘incom plete’, e.g., one th a t denotes a relation, may correspond to  the same kind of 
entities as a ‘less incom plete’ one (e.g., a one-place predicate) or even a  ‘complete 
one’, like a sentence or an individual name.
Let me first consider an expression th a t denotes a relation, like the verb 
loves. Since it is a  relation, any in terpreta tion  function m ust assign it an entity 
in the  domain of the  type (e, (e ,i)) . (T hat is, if (U , I ) is a  m odel fragm ent, then 
I(loves)  € D((e, (e, í)) , U).) If, for the sake of simplicity, we assume th a t the 
m odel fragments in our domain are over one and the same model M. =  (£/,Z), 
then  the  set of m odel fragm ents corresponding to loves will be
{(U,I)  e  T M --I(loves) ^ 0 } .
T h a t is, any model fragm ent which makes ‘somebody loves som ebody’ true is 
collected into a large set. We could also take ju s t the least inform ative elements 
of th is  set, because the  more inform ative elements are predictable from them , but 
it is sim pler to proceed in this way.
Similarly, a one-place predicate like sleeps or loves Joe (or even Joe loves) 
can be assigned a set of model fragm ents in a similar way:
{(U,I) £ T M-I{sleeps)^^}
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is the  set of m odel fragm ents in which ‘someone sleeps’. To show th a t  the coalesced 
intersection of loves and Joe (assuming th a t Joe is the direct object of loves, which 
we will get by deus ex machina), produces an analogous set, let us first see w hat 
model fragm ents correspond to individual names. Obviously, the  set for Joe is the 
following:
{ { U , I ) e P M : I ( J o e ) e U } ,
the least inform ative element of which has {j} as its universe (w here X(Joe) — j),  
and its in te rp re ta tion  ju s t holds (Joe , j ) and pairs of the form (P , { j}) (in which 
P  is a one-place predicate th a t holds for Joe).
To perform  coalesced intersection, we will deal w ith functions th a t m ap ex­
pressions to sets of model fragm ents. For example,
{ ( u , $ ) : $  =  { ( [ / , / )  e  P m - V M  €  I  (love)}},
veu
corresponds to  iXx(x  loves som eone)’, and
{<", 4): 4 = {<17, /> € T m : J  (»,«) £ /(to»e)}},
v&U
corresponds to  ‘Ax(someone loves x ) \  Both of these can be produced  from the 
set of m odel fragm ents corresponding to love using the sem antic coun terpart of A- 
abstraction . We will need the la tte r function for perform ing coalesced intersection 
w ith the m eaning of a direct object, e.g., Joe. The m eaning of Joe is also to  be 
converted in to  a  function of the appropriate sort, namely,
{<«, $>: $  =  {(U, I)  € P m '- I  (Joe) = u}},
which corresponds to ‘Ax(Joe =  x ) \  The coalesced intersection of these two 
functions is
{<*, $}: $  =  {(U, I ) e P M : \ J  (■v , z) € I(love)} D {(U, I) 6 P M -1 (Joe) =  z}}
veu
or
{<*,$>: $  =  {(U,I)  e P M - V ((” ,*> e  I  (love) A I(Joe)  =  z)}}.
veu
As can be seen, the  result is a  function th a t is only defined for Jo e , and yields 
the set of m odel fragm ents in which someone loves Joe. To com bine this m ean­
ing w ith  th a t of a sub ject’s, we have to take this set and perform  A-abstraction 
again. (Rem em ber th a t the shift from functions to their co-dom ains and back is 
simply a technical device to tre a t certain entities in the dom ain as distinguished. 
Unlike in sem antic theories where type theory has an explanatory  s ta tu s, here it 
is insignificant w hether we represent denotations w ith sets or functions th a t m ap 
to them .)
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